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Transition, Justice and  







Poland adopted limited transitional justice almost a decade after its neighbors 
Germany and the Czech Republic, but de-communization has been one of the most 
divisive issues in the political life of this young democracy1. Poles remain divided 
about the communist past, its effects on nation-building and political culture, and 
the way in which the post-communist state should deal with it. Some agree with 
their country’s choice for the Spanish model, whereas transition to democracy is ef-
fected without granting public access to secret archives, prosecuting communist 
leaders for human rights trespasses, and blocking ancien regime officials from access-
ing positions of power and responsibility. Others believe that Poland’s soft stand to-
ward communist repression provides the wrong moral example for younger gen-
erations, and allows former communists to succeed in the market economy and 
open electoral competition. Curiously enough, in Poland the strongest case against 
transitional justice was made not by former communists, but by former dissidents 
fearful of what it would reveal about the opposition movement, while the hostility 
towards the old political elite was caused not by its opposition to market economy 
and democratic politics, but by its successful adaptation to these new conditions. 
This article presents Poland’s progress in three main areas of transitional jus-
tice: 1) lustration, a process by which the government can ban former communist 
officials and secret political police agents from post-communist politics; 2) access 
for ordinary citizens to the files compiled on them by the secret political police; 
and 3) trials and court proceedings against communist officials and secret agents. 
While substantial, the literature on the Polish transitional justice tends to focus on 
lustration viewed in isolation from other methods of dealing with the communist 
past or on the ”martial law” trial of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. We know a lot 
about the key moments which steered the course of legislation towards or against 
lustration, the parliamentary debates surrounding the issue, the main arguments 
for and against the screening process, and the reasons why lustration has lagged 
behind in the country2. We also know a lot about the public’s sentiments toward 
                                                    
1 The author thanks Drs. Maria Los and Dariusz Stola for their valuable comments on earlier 
drafts of this article, Sabina Stan, Ioan Sebastian Chesches, as well as Rodica and Răzvan Zaharia 
for collecting and analyzing materials, and a number of researchers working for the Polish 
Institute for National Remembrance for candidly providing information. A number of students in 
the Department of Political Science and the Center for Post-Communist Studies at St. Francis 
Xavier University acted as research assistants. Research for this article was generously supported 
by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada through a standard research 
grant. All errors of fact and interpretation are entirely mine. 
2 See, for example, Wiktor OSIATYNSKI, ”Decommunization and Recommunization in 
Poland”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 3, nos. 3-4, Summer 1994; Aleksander SMOLAR, 
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the martial law, Jaruzelski’s justification for imposing the state of emergency, and 
the positions adopted by various political parties and actors relative to the effort to 
bringing Jaruzelski to trial and holding him accountable1. This article fills the gap 
in the literature by extending the definition of transitional justice beyond lustra-
tion, examining an array of court cases investigating abuses throughout the com-
munist era, not just the 1980s, and providing an explanatory framework that could 
account for Poland’s handicap in all three transitional justice areas. 
THE POLISH POLITICAL POLICE 
After the October 1956 de-Stalinization, the Polish communist secret political 
police, Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB), replaced the Ministry of Public Security (Minis-
terstwo Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego, with its local offices, Urzad Bezpieczenstwa) as the 
political police, intelligence, counter-intelligence, personal protection and confi-
dential communications agency. The SB, meant to protect ”the democratic people’s 
system established by the Constitution of Polish People’s Republic and the national 
interest against enemy espionage and terrorist activity”2, was part of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and included departments on intelligence, counterintelligence, 
combating hostile activity and organized opposition, surveillance of religious or-
ganizations, industry, transport, communication and farming, operational technol-
ogy, correspondence control, radio counter-intelligence and protection of the party 
leadership. The number of full-time agents grew steadily from around 10,000 in 
1957 to 25,600 in 1985, in a total population of some 37 million. The agents’ profile 
also changed. Whereas at the beginning of the communist rule most officers were 
brutish and uneducated, by the late 1980s most of them had secondary education 
and a middle class background3. 
                                                    
”Comment gerer le passé. Débats polonais”, Commentaires, no. 65, Spring 1994, pp. 53-64; Andrzej 
WALICKI, ”Transitional Justice and the Political Struggles of Post-Communist Poland”, in James 
A. McADAMS (ed.), Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies, University of Notre 
Dame, South Bend, 1997, pp. 193-196; Aleks SZCZERBIAK, ”Dealing with the Communist Past or 
the Politics of the Present? Lustration in Post-Communist Poland”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, 
no. 4, 2002, pp. 559-560; Noel CALHOUN, ”The Ideological Dilemma of Lustration in Poland”, East 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 16, no. 2, 2002, pp. 494-520, and Roman DAVID, ”Lustration 
Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and 
Poland (1989-2001)”, Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 28, no. 2, 2003, pp. 387-440. For general reviews of 
Eastern Europe that include Poland, see Maria LOS, ”Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished 
Revolutions in Central Europe”, Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 19, no. 1, 1995, pp. 117-162; Mark 
ELLIS, ”Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Block”, 
Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1996, pp. 181-197; Carmen GONZALEZ-ENRIQUEZ, 
”De-communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe”, in Alexandra 
BARAHONA DE BRITO, Carmen GONZALEZ-ENRIQUEZ, Paloma AGUILAR, The Politics of 
Memory. Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, 
pp. 218-247, and Noel CALHOUN, Dilemmas of Justice in Eastern Europe’s Democratic Transitions, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004. 
1 See Tina ROSENBERG, The Haunted Land. Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism, Vintage 
Books, New York, 1995, pp. 125-258. 
2 Antoni DUDEK, Andrzej PACZKOWSKI, ”Poland”, in Krzysztof PERSAK, Lukasz KAMINSKI 
(eds.), A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe, 1944-1989, Institute 
of National Remembrance, Warsaw, 2005, p. 228. 
3 Ibidem, p. 244. 
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The SB was independent of other state administrative organs, but never more 
than an tool of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robot-
nicza or the PZPR), which decided the hiring and promotion of the secret agents. 
After 1956, the party leadership and particularly General Secretary Wladyslaw 
Gomulka, the political police’s prisoner at one timetreated the secret services with 
reserve and made efforts to underline the supremacy of the partythe of the party. 
In 1960, SB officers were prohibited to recruit PZPR members as secret collabora-
tors, but exceptions were still permitted with the approval of the local party leader-
ship. Despite the order, the secret police continued to use party members as opera-
tional contacts and official contacts, in the absence of the standard signed pledges 
required to initiate collaboration. The SB was dominated by PZPR members, but 
party membership was not a prerequisite to join the secret police. Party member-
ship among SB functionaries decreased steadily from 84% in 1957 to 69% in 19831. 
The SB maintained an active network of secret collaborators for information 
gathering and as ”an instrument of terror”, because ”people were recruited to be 
broken” and mass recruitment meant ”humiliating people, creating an aura of fear 
[…] a way to keep people dependent”2. In 1948, 65% of all agents and 33% of all in-
formers were recruited using compromising materials (reports of theft, embezzle-
ment or improper sexual inclination and even having relatives in the West). The in-
formation network included a steady 10,000 agents until 1968, when the demand 
for informers grew rapidly when major events – the Church’s Millennium celebra-
tions, the 1968 student protests and the workers’ revolt on the Baltic Coast in 1970 – 
had to be supervised. After the imposition of the martial law in 1981, the network 
continued to grow, reaching a record level of 98,000 informers in 1988. The entire 
state administration was obliged to cooperate closely with the SB, which deeply in-
filtrated it. The most penetrated areas included the northern and western regions, 
the last to be incorporated into the country, and the Bialystok and Gdansk regions 
(known for their strong anticommunist underground and frequent social unrest). 
Larger informer networks were planned within the clergy, the judiciary, the social 
elite and the political opposition groups3. 
As other communist political police, the SB had to protect the party’s control 
over the country, crack down on dissent and opposition, and ensure acceptance of 
official ideology, policies and leaders. Its victims included pre-communist state 
dignitaries and political party leaders, industrialists, merchants and agricultural 
landowners, and members of the intelligentsia and the working class who openly 
opposed or criticized the communist regime. According to a 1979 report of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, from 1944 to 1956 the security apparatus arrested 
243,066 persons, with four-fifths of the arrests occurring in the late 1940s, at a time 
when 350,000 to 400,000 people fell victim to arrests and custody at the hands of 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, pp. 238-244. 
2 Ibidem, pp. 254-255. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 258-259. The collaboration of priests remains an open wound in Poland, a 
country with a 95% Roman Catholic population. From 1944 to 1956, the communists arrested 
almost 1,000 priests, isolated bishops, dismantled the Greek Catholic Church, and deported 
priests to Siberia. Not all priests behaved courageously. Historian Jan Zaryn listed priests who 
acted as SB informers, including the Dominican Konrad Stanislaw Hejmo, Pope John Paul II’s 
close collaborator in charge of Polish pilgrimages in Rome. Zaryn suggested that in 1977, the SB 
estimated that 2,600 priests (that is, 15% of the Polish clergy) were informers. The historian knew 
of no church leader who collaborated with the secret police. See Giovanni CUBEDDU, ”From a 
Distant Country, to Spy Close Up”, 30 Giorni, August 2005, available at www.30giorni.ir. 
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Soviet security agents. Around two million Poles, including Jaruzelski and his par-
ents, were deported to the Soviet Union during or immediately after World War II. 
The statistics do not include preventive custody, excesses during arrests, torture in 
interrogation, extermination as result of extreme prison harsh conditions, death 
sentences, and cases of murder in prisons disguised as suicides. While mass terror 
began to subside in 1954, an additional 5,600 people were detained and dozens 
were killed during the mid-1956 mass protests in Poznan, the 1960 riots in Nowa 
Huta, the 1968 student strike, and the 1970 and 1976 strikes and demonstrations on 
the Baltic Coast1. 
Once the martial law was imposed in December 1981, country leader General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski and his army collaborators acquired growing power in the 
party-controlled political system. The state administration was increasingly staffed 
with military and secret service agents, and the country’s overall command was 
taken by a military council2. Jaruzelski’s protégé Czeslaw Kiszczak, who had 
helped with the preparation and introduction of the martial law, became the first 
officer to be appointed Minister of Internal Affairs. Although he extended the se-
cret informer network within opposition ranks and designed the repression meas-
ures, Kiszczak successfully transmogrified from a hard-line communist personally 
responsible for the regime’s crimes into a key negotiator of the communist side 
during the Roundtable talks. The PZPR’s 1989 electoral defeat led to the SB’s fu-
neral as a repressive political police, but its destruction was a controlled process. 
As Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior in the Mazowiecki government, 
Kiszczak was able to destroy the most sensitive parts of the secret archive and 
camouflage the SB’s worst activities. The reforms led to the sudden collapse of the 
information network, which was almost halved in the second part of 1989. By the 
end of that year, the dying secret service still maintained 52,000 informers. From 
1989 to 1991, almost half of the intelligence officers left the service3. 
In April 1990, Parliament replaced the SB with a new organization, the State 
Protection Office (Urzad Ochrony Panstwa or UOP), and two months later Krzysztof 
Kozlowski became the first post-communist Minister of Interior. The destruction of 
the old institution clearly demarcated the past and the future, and allowed for its 
documents and property, but not personnel, to be transferred to the UOP. SB 
agents were re-hired by the UOP only after they successfully passed through a 
verification procedure. Each district formed a qualification commission, which re-
viewed applications from SB agents who wished to work for the UOP, and deter-
mined whether the candidate fulfilled the moral qualifications for service. SB agents 
who had violated the law, had infringed on human rights or had used their position 
for private gain were disqualified4. But the verification process was uneven among 
districts, prompting charges of gross unfairness and even ”procedural nihilism”5. 
                                                    
1 Antoni DUDEK, Andrzej PACZKOWSKI, ”Poland”, cit., pp. 272-274. NKVD data suggest 
that estimated number of Poles deported in 1939 and 1940 reached only half a million. I thank Dr. 
Dariusz Stola for this information. 
2 Maria LOS, Andrzej ZYBERTOWICZ, Privatizing the Police-State. The Case of Poland, 
Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2000 and Maria LOS, ”Reshaping of Elites and the Privatization of 
Security: The Case of Poland”, Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, no. 2, 2005, 
available at www.pipss.org/document351.html. 
3 Jeff FREEMAN, ”Security Services Still Distrusted”, Transition, 21 March 1997, p. 52. 
4 Monitor Polski, 21 May 1990. 
5 Noel CALHOUN, Dilemmas of Justice…cit., p. 105. 
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Of the 14,500 individuals who sought appointment, around 8,000 were approved 
for further employment in the Ministry of Interior and about 4,000 of them ended 
up working for the UOP. The rest found employment with the regular police and 
private security agencies. More than two-thirds of those who were rejected ap-
pealed to the central commission for a review of their cases, and the ombudsman 
received complaints from 589 people regarding these verification procedures. The 
procedure was never substantially revised, despite the complaints1. Following this 
initial vetting, politicians were reluctant to approve further screening of the secret 
services and the armed forces, on grounds that it would weaken national security 
by depriving the country of skilled intelligence professionals. 
To turn it into a Western-style intelligence service, the UOP was prohibited 
from monitoring the activity of the political opposition and launching surveillance 
operations without court approval, and instead was called to gather intelligence 
material in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and corruption. In May 
2002, the Polish secret services were redesigned as an intelligence community 
formed by the Foreign Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu), whose head was also 
the head of the intelligence community, and the Internal Security Agency (Agencja 
Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego), constituted on the basis of the UOP. During the 2005 
electoral campaign, the Catholic center-right Law and Justice party accused the in-
telligence services of becoming a tool in the hands of the leftist government, and re-
fusing to uncover the many corruption schemes involving government members 
and leftist party leaders. After the party won the elections and formed a minority 
government, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz announced sweeping re-
forms of the intelligence community and plans to dismantle the military intelligence 
services, all in an effort to help Poland to break with the last vestiges of its commu-
nist past. It remains to be seen how far the promised reforms will go2. 
LUSTRATION 
 
Premier Mazowiecki explicitly rejected pursuing lustration, both because he 
wished to honor the spirit of the Roundtable Agreements and because, as the first 
non-communist premier in Eastern Europe, he wanted to reassure Moscow that his 
government sought no revenge against communist leaders. On 24 August 1989, in 
a speech that set the tone for how Poland would (not) come to terms with its com-
munist past, Mazowiecki announced that a ”thick line” would be drawn between 
the past and the present. Past loyalties were not grounds for discrimination, and 
everyone, including communist officials, could start a new life if ready to embrace 
the new democratic order. Satisfied that the new government will not reprimand 
them, the PZPR leaders accepted the new order, many of them renouncing politics 
after the party dissolved itself in January 1990. Its legal heir, the Union of 
Democrat Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej or the SLD), broke with the principles 
of democratic centralism, encouraged internal debates, and formally embraced 
                                                    
1 Rzeczpospolita, 3 September 1990. 
2 For the 2002 reforms, see David M. DASTYCH, ”No ’Zero Option’ But a Shake Up”, 
available at www.fas.org/irp/world/poland/dastych.html. 
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parliamentary democracy and free market economy1. Its young leader, former 
communist apparatchik Aleksander Kwasniewski, and intellectual and Solidarity 
activist Adam Michnik, both key architects of the Roundtable Agreements, stressed 
their commitment to the Spanish way, ignoring the question of its relevance and 
applicability to post-communist transformations2. 
The ”thick line” policy allowed Poland to avoid bloodshed and effect a smooth 
transition to democracy, but inhibited government from pursuing lustration as a 
component of transitional justice, gave victims wronged by the old repressive re-
gime no voice, and reflected no wide public consultations. While catchy, the phrase 
was never fully explained, and people were not told where exactly the line was 
drawn. The policy divided the public into two camps with opposite views on lus-
tration. Over the 1994-1999 period, a clear majority of Poles favored vetting key po-
litical officials for their links with the SB, while only one in three Poles opposed 
lustration. From 1996 to 1999, around 45% of Poles supported, and as many op-
posed, the exclusion of PZPR officials from public office3. Clearly, the policy 
reflected the popular mood only in the early 1990s, if at all, and helped Poles to 
postpone dealing with their past honestly, not to put it behind them. In the last 15 
years, the country was rocked by numerous scandals exposing top politicians as 
former SB agents. Each time, supporters of the ”thick line” policy reaffirmed its 
merits, but the usually defiant attitude and repeated denials of the former secret 
agents, coupled with their uncanny ability to take advantage of communist-era 
networks to turn their old political power into economic power, prompted many 
Poles to question the virtues of the ”amnesty but not amnesia” option4. 
As early as 1989, influential politicians denounced the ”thick line” policy as a 
cowardly moral compromise or a ”clever communist manipulation, serving the in-
terests of the nomenklatura who wanted to enrich themselves while continuing to 
rule the country indirectly behind the scenes”5. Among the critics were politicians 
for whom a compromise with the communists was simply unacceptable, and Soli-
darity members embittered by their marginalization at the Roundtable talks and 
the new government’s failure to offer them a satisfactory share of power as a re-
ward for their sacrifices as underground militants. In the face of demands for 
de-communization mounted by these groups, in September 1991 President Jaruzel-
ski asked Parliament to shorten his mandate and prepare presidential elections 
based on direct popular vote. In the poll, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa easily 
                                                    
1 In January 1990, the Polish communists regrouped under the banner of the Social 
Democracy of Republic of Poland (SdPR). The SdPR and its allies participated in the 1993 
elections as the SLD. 
2 I thank Dr. Maria Los for this observation. See also Adam SZOSTKIEWICZ, ”The Time for 
De-communization Has Past”, The Warsaw Voice, 28 June 1998. Mazowiecki’s speech appeared in 
Sprawozdanie stenograficzne Sejmu PRL, 24 August 1989, pp. 84-86. Three recent publications worth 
noting are Piotr GRZELAK, Wojna o lustracje, Trio, Warsaw, 2005; Pawel SPIEWAK, Pamic po 
komunizmie, Slowo/Obraz/Terytoria, Gdans, 2005, and Artur WOLEK, ”Lustracja jako walka o 
reguly polityki I proba wzmacniania legitymizacji nowych demokracji”, Studia Polityczne, no. 15, 
2004, pp. 147-173. 
3 Aleks SZCZERBIAK, ”Dealing with the Communist Past…cit.”, pp. 559-560. 
4 When confronted with one of his victims, an elderly woman, Adam Hunter, an SB officer 
accused of carrying out brutal torture, replied: ”Shut up, you old bitch”. The Hunter case is 
detailed below. 
5 Andrzej WALICKI, ”Transitional Justice…cit.”, p. 190. 
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defeated Mazowiecki, who had lost popularity as a result of the shock therapy re-
form program of Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz. 
Even after it explicitly rejected lustration, Poland was forced to reform its state 
structure to make it more adapt to effect post-communist transition. A key candi-
date for reform was the judiciary, which had close and visible ties to the SB. With 
some exceptions, communist judges and prosecutors were obedient instruments of 
the repressive apparatus, detaining opponents without legal basis, orchestrating 
show-trials with pre-determined outcomes, fabricating evidence, and sending 
thousands to prison for their political opinions. Instead of the Czech lustration 
model, Poland used another approach to decide which judges and prosecutors 
could continue their careers. It absolved tainted individuals who confessed to their 
crimes, however gruesome they were. Confession was not public, but written, as 
prosecutors had to provide signed declarations describing their communist-era ac-
tivities. If the Ministry of Justice deemed the declaration false, the prosecutor was 
not reappointed. While avoiding costly, lengthy and disruptive disciplinary proce-
dures, the procedure allowed for the dismissal of only the prosecutors providing 
false declarations, not those who had violated human rights with impunity but 
fully disclosed their activities. After such verifications, only some 10% of all prose-
cutors and one-third of the staff of the General Prosecutor’s Office were dismissed, 
though it was widely believed that many more had infringed human rights and 
collaborated with the SB. Solidarity representatives claimed that the screening of 
the prosecutors stalled democratization by disregarding the rule of law and violat-
ing the prosecutors’ civil rights1. 
Following the first fully free general elections of 27 October 1991, Jan Ol-
szewski formed a short-lived minority government with the support of a volatile 
center-right coalition rejecting compromise with the communists and supporting 
radical lustration. In February 1992, center-right deputies asked Parliament to con-
demn the communist regime, but the house members refused, wary that a com-
pletely new beginning would bring legal chaos and anarchy, and rob them of the 
many privileges they enjoyed. Shortly afterwards, on 28 May, the lower Sejm ac-
cepted in its first reading a decision obliging the Minister of Interior to disclose 
publicly the names of all current senior public officials occupying the rank of pro-
vincial governor upwards who had collaborated with the SB. A special investiga-
tion bureau had to compile a list of such collaborators on the basis of the secret ar-
chives. Compelling the Ministry of Interior to unmask former spies from among 
public officials had an obvious advantage. The ministry, as secret archive custo-
dian, could operate the most accurate identification. But the process was opened to 
political manipulation, since the quality and quantity of revelations depended on 
the minister, a political figure representing the government. The appeal procedure 
was not formally laid down, an oversight disadvantaging the opposition over the 
government, whose representatives could use informal channels to pressure the 
minister. There were no clear instructions as to whom the bureau should release 
the information, and the one-week deadline to release the list made errors likely. 
Leftist representatives denounced the initiative for breaching ”state secrets” and 
                                                    
1 Of the total 3,278 prosecutors, 311 were dismissed. Other 48 dismissal recommendations 
were overturned by an appeals commission. See Sprawozdanie stenograficzne Sejmu RP, 4 February 
1994, pp. 24-25, and Sprawozdanie stenograficzne Sejmu PRL, 29 September 1989, pp. 84-87, 13 
October 1989, pp. 89-93, and 30 December 1989, pp. 134-143. 
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pursuing partisan aims, and argued that lustration was incompatible with democ-
racy because it violated the principles of inclusiveness and due process, and the 
bans on retroactivity and collective punishment1. While the principle that public 
officials should have clean pasts was reasonable, the opposition denounced its 
practical implementation as ”morally questionable and politically dangerous”2. 
Those fears were confirmed a week later, when Minister of Interior Antoni 
Macierewicz presented Parliament with the names of 64 persons who allegedly fig-
ured in the SB archives as informers, not least Walesa and some former dissidents 
advocating lustration3. The list was so hard to believe for some that it sparked a 
public scandal. On 23 July, the Sejm accepted the view that only ten of those 
named could be suspected of collaboration, and only six of those ten had signed 
compromising documents4. Faced with criticism from all corners, the minister ad-
mitted that the SB unsuccessfully tried to recruit some of those named. Instead of 
apologizing for damaging those persons’ reputation he asked them to come for-
ward and ”tell the whole truth” to thereby restore their credibility. Michnik re-
jected the manner in which individuals were unmasked as informers, noting that 
the ”logic of the guillotine” would demand the blood of all ”traitors”, including 
the premier and the Minister of Interior5. In the end, not those named, but the min-
ister saw his credibility shattered. The Olszewski cabinet lost the confidence of Par-
liament, after pro-lustration legislators reconsidered their position. On 19 June, the 
Constitutional Court ruled the lustration decision unconstitutional, thus blocking 
its further implementation6. More importantly, the release of the names compro-
mised the lustration effort. By coming across as a battle for power among politi-
cians, the name disclosure showed how lustration could be manipulated to shape 
the politics of the present more than to address the injustices of the past. 
In the coming years, Parliament debated six bills on how to deal with former 
informers, but none advanced. Between 1992 and 1993, the government of Hanna 
Suchocka, a member of Mazowiecki’s Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna or 
the UD), focused on economic transition, and neglected the politics of the past. Af-
ter the SLD and the Peasant Party, the direct successor of the communist satellite, 
won the September 1993 elections, lustration was hardly ever mentioned in Parlia-
ment, but did not entirely disappear from public life. Anticommunist intellectuals 
and politicians complained about the stolen revolution, deplored the lack of politi-
cal will to condemn communist mistakes and horrors, and denounced the ”thick 
line” policy. The SLD leaders insisted that employment or secret collaboration with 
                                                    
1 For the arguments, see Monitor Polski, 11 June 1992; Anna SABBAT-SWIDLICKA, ”Poland: 
A Year of Three Governments”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, vol. 2, no. 1, 1993, 
p. 103; Louisa VINTON, ”Poland’s Government Crisis: An End in Sight?”, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Research Report, vol. 1, no. 30, 1992, pp. 16-20; Rzeczpospolita, 21 January 1992, and Wiktor 
OSIATYNSKI, ”Agent Walesa?”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 1, no. 2, Summer 1992, 
pp. 28-30. 
2 Andrzej WALICKI, ”Transitional Justice…cit.”, p. 197. 
3 A second list of 37 names was circulated to a narrower circle of top politicians, including 
President Walesa. 
4 Later it became clear that only four of those Macierewicz named had not been 
collaborators. I thank Dr. Los for this information. 
5 Adam MICHNIK, Jakub TISCHNER, Jakub ZAKOWSKI, Miedzy panem a plebanem, Znak, 
Cracow, 1995, p. 588. 
6 For his unwise disclosure of the list, Macierewicz faced a trial behind closed doors, which 
was discontinued when Parliament refused to indict him. 
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the communist secret police could not be held against anyone, since these struc-
tures were legal state organs. The prevailing popular mood contradicted this view. 
A 19 94 opinion poll found that 75% of respondents believed that SB collaborators 
should not occupy senior state posts1. 
Lustration did not come to the forefront until late 1995, when the so-called 
Oleksy Affair tilted the balance in favor of publicly disclosing the politicians’ ties 
to the SB. In view of the presidential elections organized that year, incumbent 
Walesa ran an aggressive campaign deploying sharp anticommunist rhetoric 
against his contender, SLD leader Kwasniewski. After his electoral defeat but be-
fore leaving the presidency, a bitter Walesa claimed that Poland’s security was en-
dangered by SLD Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, who had been and still was a Rus-
sian spy. After the Minister of Interior repeated the accusations, Parliament set up 
special committees to investigate the affair. Oleksy forcefully declared his inno-
cence, but had to step down before the military prosecutors dismissed the charge 
and anticommunist dissidents Kuron and Karol Modzelewski accused the secret 
police of interfering in politics. According to them, the allegations against Oleksy 
were prepared by the same secret officer who compiled evidence against them in 
the 1980s. A former PZPR official, Oleksy was friends with a KGB man and, ac-
cording to former Minister of Interior Krzysztof Kozlowski, failed to notice that ”in 
1989 Poland became a sovereign state and the contacts that in the 1980s were not de 
facto treated as spying have now changed their meaning […] Formerly, nobody in 
the party saw anything wrong with them. On the contrary, for the party activists it 
was a chance to speed up their career”2. A decade later, when a court found that he 
hid his collaboration with the communist military intelligence service, Oleksy had 
to step down as Parliament speaker. The decision indirectly vindicated Walesa by 
establishing Oleksy’s collaboration with the Polish military intelligence, not the 
KGB3. After the issue of collaboration had brought down Oleksy’s leftist govern-
ment, in addition to Olszewski’s rightist one, Poland learned that the refusal to 
adopt lustration imposed costs on parties on both sides of the political spectrum. It 
was in this context that the center-left Freedom Union (Unia Wolnosci or the UW), 
the Labor Union (Unia Pracy or the UP) and the Peasant Party came to see the 
merits of ”moderate” lustration4. 
Kwasniewski’s apology in Parliament to ”all those who had experienced injus-
tices and wickedness of the [communist] authorities and the system before 1989” 
and his pledge to ”complete the process of coming to terms with the past” were 
deemed insufficient by the pro-lustration camp, and his 1995 electoral triumph 
over Walesa added more fuel to complaints about the ”stolen revolution”5. To di-
rect attention away from the Oleksy Affair and protect his tainted SLD allies, but 
also to honor his pledge to distance Poland from its repressive past and establish 
his personal control over the screening process, on 1 February 1996 Kwasniewski 
unexpectedly sent Parliament a modest lustration proposal, which called on a 
newly created Commission of Public Confidence to vet public officials for their SB 
                                                    
1 Maria LOS, Andrzej ZYBERTOWICZ, Privatizing the Police-State…cit., p. 147. 
2 Quoted in Maria LOS, ”Reshaping of Elites…cit.”. Also New York Times, 23 January 1996, 
and Jakub KARPINSKI, ”Polish Security Services and the Oleksy Case”, Transition, 1 November 
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3 New York Times, 14 January 2005. 
4 Noel CALHOUN, ”The Ideological Dilemma…cit.”, p. 512. 
5 Gazeta Wyborcza, 11-19 November 1993, and Andrzej WALICKI, ”Transitional Justice…cit.”, p. 200. 
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ties. According to the president, the process aimed to protect the state against for-
mer secret agents and help innocent people defend themselves against false accu-
sations. The ”conscience of the Polish Left”, Parliament deputy speaker Aleksander 
Malachowski, was to chair the commission, made up of senior judges appointed by 
the president himself. The house turned down the proposal, after the pro-lustra-
tion coalition complained that it only affected the secret part-time informers (the 
muscle), but not the full-time agents or party activists overseeing the activity of the 
secret political police (the brains)1. 
The house adopted the three-party coalition’s counter-proposal in April 1997 
as the Lustration Law. According to the initiators, lustration was needed because it 
allowed citizens to know the backgrounds of their public representatives, ensure 
that public officials were not vulnerable to blackmail on account of their past col-
laboration with communist secret services, and de-politicize the issue of SB col-
laboration by subjecting it to a judicial process2. The SLD refused to support the 
proposal, unless intelligence and counter-intelligence agents were excluded from 
the provisions of the law, collaboration was narrowly defined as ”conscious par-
ticipation in actions against the church, the independent trade unions, the nation or 
creating a threat to civil liberties and property of others”, and low-level public offi-
cials were included among lustrated categories. The house rejected all these 
amendments, which made the proposal unworkable. 
Inspired from the 1989 vetting procedure of the prosecutors, the law was di-
rected not against all former PZPR officials, but only against those with links to 
the communist political police. The law did not apply collective guilt retroac-
tively, since it did not impose automatic sanctions for collaboration with the SB. 
All elected state officials from the rank of deputy provincial governor upwards to 
the ministers, the premier and the president, as well as the barristers, judges, 
prosecutors and public mass media leaders, were required to submit written dec-
larations stating whether or not they consciously worked for or collaborated with 
the SB between 1944 and 1990. A 21-judge Lustration Court headed by a prosecu-
tor, subject to lustration itself, checked the declarations’ accuracy. As clarified by 
the Constitutional Court, collaboration had to be conscious, secret and connected 
with the SB’s operational activities. Simply having submitted a declaration of in-
tent to collaborate was not sufficient proof of collaboration, as there had to be 
proof of actual activities undertaken by an agent or informer, in the form of infor-
mation reports. The public office holders and candidates to such positions making 
false statements were banned from politics for ten years and had their names pub-
lished in the State Gazette. By contrast, the political careers and public image of 
former SB agents and informers who acknowledged collaboration were not af-
fected, as they retained their posts and were not exposed to public condemnation. 
In the case of elected officials, it was up to the voters to decide if they wanted to 
support individuals who had disclosed their tainted past. The Lustration Court 
was granted access to the archives of the UOP and the Ministries of Defense and 
Interior, and its verdicts were subject to appeal within 14 days. The decision of the 
appeal court was binding, and anyone found guilty had to resign the office imme-
diately. If the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the appeal court, the 
whole lustration process was re-opened. 
                                                    
1 Rzeczpospolita, 2 February 1997. 
2 See Aleks SZCZERBIAK, ”Dealing with the Communist Past…cit.”, pp. 562-564. 
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The greatest impediment to the implementation of the law was the judges’ un-
willingness to serve on the Lustration Court. While members of the judiciary were 
among the first to be lustrated in Poland, the process targeted prosecutors more 
than judges. As a result, few judges were banned from their positions. Those who 
did continue their careers were part of the old system, thus unwilling to expose SB 
collaborators, become involved in a process calling them to hand down political 
judgments, and implement a controversial law which they did not help to formu-
late. Despite numerous attempts to recruit the 21 required judges, in the end only 
11 agreed to serve on the Lustration Court. In June 1998, Parliament recognized the 
Warsaw District Appeal Court as the Lustration Court (thus circumvented the 
problem of finding judges willing to conduct lustration trials), transformed the lus-
tration prosecutor from the government’s representative in lustration trials to the 
key figure conducting the process, analyzing declarations, collecting information 
and interviewing witnesses, and allowed Parliament members to initiate lustration 
procedures through ”parliamentary denunciation”. 
A year after his reelection in 2000, President Kwasniewski submitted to Parlia-
ment changes inspired from his 1996 lustration proposal which significantly lim-
ited the applicability of the 1997 Lustration Law. First, persons who collaborated 
with the intelligence, counter-intelligence and border guard units were exempted 
from the law, although historians argued and former political prisoners that every 
Ministry of Interior department, including the SB, functioned as a repressive appa-
ratus, and thus it was senseless to single out some departments as purportedly 
”harmless” components of the political police. Second, the lustration prosecutor 
had to notify persons suspected of having lied in their statements in advance of 
their lustration trial, and the Lustration Court had to pass a clear guilty or not 
guilty verdict, and no longer set cases aside for lack of evidence. Third, the defini-
tion of collaboration was changed to include only the spying actions that harmed 
church organizations, the democratic opposition, trade union or ”the nation’s aspi-
rations to sovereignty”, although such consequences were difficult to establish in-
disputably. The SLD-UP parliamentary majority hailed the changes for no longer 
allowing parties to use lustration against political rivals, but the opposition ac-
cused the government of trying to shield some of its allies from being declared lus-
tration liars. At the time, the Lustration Court was hearing the cases of three SLD 
leaders suspected of having kept silent about their collaboration. After the Sejm ap-
proved the amendments on 15 February 2002, the opposition petitioned the Consti-
tutional Court, arguing that the changes exceeded the framework of legislative 
amendments and constituted an entirely new legislative initiative. Four months 
later the court embraced that position and ruled the amendments unconstitutional, 
thus allowing some 20 lustration trials to resume1. On 15 October, President Kwas-
niewski promulgated the reformulated changes to the Lustration Law, which 
Rzeczpospolita decried as an attempt to ”strip the law of its small significance”, and 
”block the way to the truth”2. 
The Lustration Court adopted a cautious stance toward unmasking tainted pub-
lic officials. By mid 1999, only some 300 of all 23,000 officials asked to provide lustra-
tion statements admitted to their secret collaboration. The lustration prosecutor 
                                                    
1 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 25 October 2001, and ”Amendments Water Down 
Lustration”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report, vol. 4, no. 8, 26 February 2002. 
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Boguslaw Nizienski announced that he had sent seven statements to the Lustration 
Court, which subsequently charged all their unnamed authors (which included 
two SLD and one Peasant Party deputies, a deputy minister and three lawyers). 
According to the Lustration Law, statements were first checked by the lustration 
prosecutor, who sent questionable statements to the Lustration Court for scrutiny. 
The court could launch proceedings and examine the SB files of the author of the 
statement. Making excuses for his sluggish activity, Nizienski told journalists that 
the secret archives contained ”significant circumstantial evidence” that some 
post-communist politicians had been SB collaborators, but offered only ”fragmen-
tary traces in the form of journal entries” the Lustration Court found insufficient to 
lay charges. Nizienski defended the low number of statements he examined by 
saying that he focused on sure cases. The press charged that it will take Nizienski 
some 1,333 years to check all statements, based on the slow pace of his work1. 
The Lustration Law was intended to apply to the 1997 presidential elections, 
but the Lustration Court was not constituted in time. Knowing that their state-
ments would not be properly verified, only 11 candidates admitted to having 
served as secret agents2. In 2000 and 2005, the law was used to screen presidential 
candidates, but public revelations about the candidate’s past marked the first poll 
only. In 2002, Wieslaw Walendziak, head of the election team of Solidarity leader 
Marian Krzaklewski, sued for libel his counterpart from incumbent President 
Kwasniewski’s election team, Ryszard Kalisz, for suggesting that Walendziak 
may have pressured the UOP to provide the Lustration Court with documents al-
leging that Kwasniewski was a secret agent. After Kalisz asked Premier Jerzy 
Buzek to declare whether Walendziak gave orders to the UOP, Buzek reminded 
that a parliamentary Special Services Committee inquiry found no irregularities in 
the lustration of presidential candidates. As the scandal turned public, commenta-
tors bitterly noted that voters had to choose between former SB agent Andrzej 
Olechowski and a former communist minister suspected of having been a secret 
informer, Kwasniewski. In his lustration statement, Olechowski admitted that he 
was a SB collaborator for two decades, but insisted that he dealt exclusively with 
economic intelligence3. 
At the time, two other presidential candidates, Kwasniewski and Walesa, 
faced court trials designed to clear allegations that they were SB agents, a collabo-
ration they denied in their lustration statements. Kwasniewski stood for re-election 
once he was cleared of connections with the SB. After reviewing secret documents 
on the activity of an agent cone-named Alek and interviewing four former SB offi-
cers, the Lustration Court ruled that Kwasniewski was not a secret collaborator 
while Minister of Sport in the last communist government. The Gazeta Wyborcza 
daily lamented that ”Poland’s destiny hung on the testimonies of four communist 
spooks”, but hailed the court decision for averting a political crisis and strengthen-
ing the public’s trust in the democratic process by paving the way for the reelec-
tion of a popular president. Although the information in the secret file was not cor-
roborated by other sources, the court deemed the secret files as being ”completely 
and undoubtedly true”, and cleared the president without completely ruling out 
the possibility that Kwasniewski was Alek. An angry Kwasniewski threatened 
                                                    
1 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 8 June 1999. 
2 “Poland”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 6, no. 1, Winter 1997, p. 22. 
3 Lubos PALATA, ”Split Decision”, Transition on Line, 14 August 2000, available at www.tol.cz. 
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”those who falsified documents and palmed them off on the court” that they will 
never be able ”to sleep calmly” because the ”Polish democracy will find them”1. 
The next day Walesa rejected accusations of having collaborated with the SB 
in the early 1970s. According to the secret documents the court studied, false evi-
dence was produced in the early 1980s to block Walesa’s Nobel Peace Prize nomi-
nation. The plans succeeded partially. In 1982, Walesa’s name was crossed off the 
list of nominees, but he received the prize a year later, after Western intelligence 
services dismissed the allegations. The false documents were used again in 1991, 
when Walesa figured on Macierewicz’s list, and in 1993, when Jaroslaw Kaczynski 
reiterated the accusation2. While rejecting the charges against himself, Walesa was 
confident that Kwasniewski, whom he deeply despised, had cooperated with the 
SB without having to sign a collaboration pledge, because he was ”one of them”. 
After being cleared of collaboration charges, Walesa lamented that the ruling con-
vinced no one, since ”those who believed me, will continue to believe me, while 
those who believed I was an agent will continue to believe that too”3. 
In its first five years of application, the law affected prominent cases. Because 
lustration and appeal procedures were slow, the verdicts were often handed down 
long after politicians who misrepresented their past ended their public mandate. 
Thus, even when the Lustration Court branded an individual a lustration liar, the 
verdict did not result in the loss of position, if the individual no longer occupied a 
public office. Not surprisingly, the majority of those accused of having lied in their 
lustration statements appealed the verdict and defended their innocence, but only 
in 2002 in the case of Marian Jurczyk did the Supreme Court overturn a decision of 
the Lustration Court. The Lustration Court ruled that Jurczyk lied in his declara-
tion by not disclosing that he worked for the SB in 1977-1979 out of fear for his life. 
The ruling cost Jurczyk, the leader of Solidarity protests in Szczecin in August 
1980, his seat in the Senate. Supreme Court judge Piotr Hofmanski argued that the 
lower court overlooked evidence showing that the information Jurczyk provided 
to the SB ”had no effect”, and his anticommunist activities proved that his behav-
ior did not amount to ”conscious and secret collaboration” with the SB. Jurczyk al-
ways insisted that the SB deemed the information he supplied ”operationally use-
less”. The verdict did not convince Solidarity founder Andrzej Gwiazda, who 
claimed that Jurczyk was not a regular informer, but an agent of influence who 
could ”render greater services by speaking on some matter than by reporting that 
someone was about to distribute leaflets”4. 
                                                    
1 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 18 July and 1 and 8 August 2000, and ”Polish 
President Cleared of Secret Police Links”, CNN, 10 August 2000. 
2 In 1993, in the book Lewy Czerwcowy Kaczynski accused Walesa’s presidential aid 
Mieczyslaw Wachowski of collaboration. Walesa asked the Minister of Interior to release his 
secret file, but the minister refused, on grounds that the president had no legal authority to 
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Several other prominent cases are worth mentioning. In late 1999, Deputy Pre-
mier and Minister of Interior Janusz Tomaszewski resigned in protest to the Lus-
tration Court’s decision to check his statement. The case was important because, as 
Minister of Interior, Tomaszewski had jurisdiction over the secret archives which 
the Lustration Court used to verify the statements. After the press alleged that the 
minister had gathered intelligence to discredit opposition politicians and used the 
secret archives to settle political accounts, observers took issue with the fact that 
the secret files and the identity of SB agents remained known only to a handful of 
high-ranking politicians not subject to parliamentary supervision1. As a result, an 
independent institute gained custody of the secret archive (see below). 
In 2002, the court cleared SLD parliamentary caucus leader Jerzy Jaskiernia of 
being a lustration liar by not disclosing his ties with SB in the 1970s, but found that 
former head of Walesa’s Presidential Office Tadeusz Kwiatkowski failed to dis-
close that he was formally registered as a SB agent in 1974-75, and delivered infor-
mation to the SB without being a registered agent in 1969-19702. The same year, the 
Polish commissioner for European Union integration Slawomir Wiatr admitted 
that he ”willingly and covertly” collaborated with the SB, and governmental 
sources said that, when appointing Wiatr to the post, Premier Leszek Miller knew 
his past. Ombudsman Andrzej Zoll deemed Wiatr's appointment as dubious, since 
Poland’s European Union integration process might be affected by revelations into 
Wiatr’s past. The opposition asked for Wiatr’s removal, as to permit ”a person who 
quite recently served the secret services that fought against institutions of the Free 
World” to oversee Poland’s European integration ”discredits the idea of integra-
tion and affects Poland’s international image”, but Miller said that Polish lustration 
was not high on the European Union agenda. The Sejm’s European Integration 
Commission allowed Wiatr to keep his post3. 
The latest scandal took place in mid 2005, when Premier Marek Belka was 
asked to resign over allegations that he had collaborated with the SB. Secret docu-
ments showed that, before undertaking a study trip to the United States in 1984, 
Belka agreed to inform the SB if approached by foreign intelligence officers and to 
seek potential informers for Poland, but provided SB with information of ”no im-
portance” on his return home. Scholars leaving communist Poland were some-
times approached by SB officers ahead of their trip abroad. Belka refused to step 
down, asking instead for his 68-page secret file to be declassified. He eventually 
lost the premiership not because the Lustration Court found him a liar, but because 
his party failed to win the 2005 elections4. 
ACCESS TO THE SECRET ARCHIVE 
As long as tainted politicians will refuse to publicly acknowledge their former 
ties to the SB, Poland will continue to face similar lustration scandals when infor-
mation contained in the secret archives becomes available to the public by other 
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means. As any other communist political police, the SB kept detailed records of its 
activities, and compiled files on both its victims and informers. The fate of the se-
cret archive became a bone of contention immediately after the collapse of the com-
munist regime, and has represented a subject of heated debates ever since. 
There is some controversy with respect to the total number of files the Polish 
communist secret police compiled. A ministerial instruction issued in 1949, when 
the record already contained files on 1.2 million people, listed 23 social categories 
to be automatically included, from prisoners and members of illegal organizations, 
to pre-war landowners, party activists, industrialists and foreign currency dealers. 
By 1953, some 5.2 million Poles (in a total population of 26.5 million) had secret 
files. Following the 1955 thaw, certain documents were removed from the archive, 
which still contained files on some 1.6 million people. A central card system made 
it possible to search the data base on those under surveillance and on secret in-
formers without knowing their names. Secret collaborators could be found accord-
ing to their home address, workplace, professional environment, code name or 
foreign language command. The SB took great care to prevent leaks of sensitive in-
formation by restricting access to the catalogue to a specific department, whose 
agents each had access only to different parts of the card system. By 1987, the cata-
logue totaled around 3.1 million cards. The SB started to computerize the archive 
in 1969, but it is unclear how many files were available electronically by the end of 
the communist regime1. According to historians, the extant secret archive totals 
some 90 linear kilometers of documents, including records on more than 98,000 se-
cret spies2. In 1999, 80 meters of ”lost” archives, including signed declarations of 
cooperation and payment receipts, were discovered in a cellar of the former SB 
headquarters in Warsaw3. 
To keep their operations secret, agents started to destroy selected materials as 
early as August 1989, when it became clear that the PZPR had lost its grip on 
power. By the end of the year, students stormed the PZPR buildings and found 
equipment for destroying incriminating files and sacks of shredded documents. In 
response, they called on the state to take over and preserve the SB and the party ar-
chives. The government condemned the students’ unlawful occupation of party 
buildings, but began to take the question of the secret archives more seriously4. On 
31 January 1990, after Sejm deputies asked for guarantees for the safety of the ar-
chive, Minister of Interior Kiszczak issued an order to halt file destruction, and al-
lowed historians and intellectuals to access the archives and report on their con-
tent. No external monitoring commission ensured compliance with his order5. Af-
ter Kiszczak’s removal and the dismantling of the SB, the Deputy Prosecutor Gen-
eral asked the UOP to investigate the file destruction. The service revealed that 
from August 1989 to February 1990 many SB secret documents were destroyed, in-
cluding the files of high-ranking post-communist politicians and operational mate-
rials on 1,200 informers and materials documenting the infiltration of the church 
and opposition circles. The UOP admitted that the SB leaders ordered the docu-
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ment destruction in violation of standard protocol1. As a result, prosecutors 
brought charges against those responsible for the damage. The Lodz district court 
heard a case against three officials who allegedly ordered the destruction of files 
regarding the clergy and the Solidarity, but the hearing was stalled in 1993, and set 
aside in 19952. A year later, a military court handed down short suspended sen-
tences to five officers found guilty of destroying from 30 to 50% of the military in-
telligence secret archive3. In 1993, the Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional 
Responsibility began investigating the destruction of the summaries of the Polit-
buro and Central Committee Secretariat meetings of 1982-1989,as ordered by Jaru-
zelski and carried out by Kiszczak. Two years later the case was dropped when the 
SLD dominated the commission. 
In Poland’s negotiated transition, the Ministry of Interior was reluctant to 
open the secret archives and expose its network of informers, while the Solidarity 
wanted to prevent the violence that could have followed revelations potentially 
devastating for the unsuspecting families and friends of the secret informers. How-
ever, there were rumors that selected politicians close to the Minister of Interior 
and prominent intellectuals were allowed to see their personal files4. The lack of 
procedure for file access reinforced the feeling that the archive was regarded as a 
powerful tool to settle political disputes. Repeated leaks of secret archival docu-
ments and the circulation of damaging rumors forced victims of these allegations 
to undertake expensive and lengthy libel suits to clear their names. While most 
Solidarity successors feared that the archives could not be opened without violat-
ing due process and civil rights, the closure of the files imposed heavy costs on in-
nocent people. In addition, the former communists’ victory in the 1993 parliamen-
tary poll gave rise to sobering reflection among the Solidarity heirs, who feared 
that the new rulers would destroy the most valuable archival documents to cover 
up their past activities. As a result, in 1997 Parliament agreed to partly open the se-
cret archive to the public5. Access to personal files was granted to those wronged 
by the communist regime, but not to the informers. After the Tomaszewski scan-
dal, the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamieci Narodowej or IPN) be-
came the archive custodian. 
The Institute was set up in late 1998 to investigate Nazi and communist 
crimes, gather evidence to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes, inform and 
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educate the public with respect to Poland’s recent past, and give citizens access to 
their own secret files. The Lustration Law also charged the IPN with helping to in-
vestigate claims of collaboration, vetting the background of public-office seekers, 
and granting file access to researchers, historians and dissidents wishing to conduct 
their own searches. The Institute employs about 2,000 researchers working in the 
Committee for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, bureaus for ar-
chival research and public education and local chapters. It began to work in earnest 
in June 2000, when Parliament named independent senator Leon Kieres as the IPN 
head for a five-year term, after three candidates had previously failed to win the 
three-fifths required majority. (In December 2005 Kieres was replaced by Janusz 
Kurtyka1.) After his appointment, Kieres pledged to gather together the secret files 
dispersed among institutions and provide ”careful” access to secret files in order to 
avoid ”irreversible damage and harm through fast but chaotic activities that would 
discredit the institute”. Kieres further promised to grant access to all those pursued 
by the SB and ensure that ”everyone has an equal chance of access to personal mate-
rials”2. By 2005, some 14,000 Poles had been allowed to read their files3. 
The slow pace at which files were made available and the IPN’s failure to ful-
fill its mandate to publicly name secret agents and informers apparently 
prompted journalist Bronislaw Wildstein to steal from the Institute a working list 
of over 240,000 names and posted it on the internet in February 2005s of former SB 
agents, military intelligence, secret covert informers, prospective candidates to in-
former positions and victims, and the list did not distinguish between perpetra-
tors and victims, thus exposing all those named to the suspicion that they had col-
laborated and arousing concern that the incomplete data may be used for political 
purposes or personal vendetta. Prosecutors launched an inquiry into the case, but 
were unable to identify the IPN employee who helped Wildstein. Refusing to 
name his accomplice, Wildstein defended his action as legitimate, since ”this is 
not our past, this is our present. Those people are present and play important 
roles in our reality”. Roman Catholic priest Jozef Maj, whose name appeared on 
the list, saw the leak as a ”blessed offense” that finally launched the process of 
reaching the truth in public life4. But Rzeczpospolita fired Wildstein, whom Kieres 
accused of being irresponsible, and Prime Minister Belka asked the UOP to ensure 
that agents on active duty were not affected by the revelations5. Many of those on 
the list asked the IPN to allow them to read their secret file, regardless of whether 
they were victims or informers6. 
The list’s publication increased pressure on Polish authorities to open up the 
secret archives. However, file access could prove necessary but not sufficient to 
find the truth about secret collaboration and communist repression. Many histori-
                                                    
1 Before assuming the IPN leadership, Kurtyka acted as head of the Institute’s Cracow 
branch. An active participant in the anticommunist opposition of that town, Kurtyka confirmed 
his readiness to allow access to the Institute’s archives to commissions clarifying connections of 
priests with the communist secret services. The Warsaw Voice, 8 March 2006. 
2 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 13 June 2000. 
3 Radio Polonia, 4 February 2005. 
4 Associated Press, 13 February 2005. The list was available at http://lista.atspace.org. 
5 Deutsche Welle, 8 February 2005. 
6 Wildstein unmasked Leslaw Maleszka as an SB informer. A journalist with Gazeta 
Wyborcza, the most important anti-lustration daily, Makeszka reported on the opposition Student 
Solidarity Committee he co-founded in 1977 with Wildstein. In 1980, Wildstein emigrated to 
France, where he worked as a journalist for the Polish monthly Kontakt and Radio Free Europe. 
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ans insist that, since the files were intended for internal use only, secret officers 
had no reason to fabricate them. But a recent case showed the discrepancy between 
communist reality and its reflection in the files, and suggested the possibility that 
officers could have generated records of collaboration under pressure to support 
their promotion, prove their usefulness in the repression apparatus, cover up inef-
ficiency in intelligence work or complement dwindling networks of active inform-
ers. In 2005, Malgorzata Niezabitowska, a Solidarity Weekly reporter who later be-
came the spokeswoman for the Mazowiecki government, was accused of collabora-
tion. According to her, accusations were traceable to her only encounter with SB 
agents on 15 December 1981. Although interrogated for seven hours without food 
or water, she refused to become their tool and tell them anything other than infor-
mation they already knew. According to her secret file, however, Niezabitowska 
ultimately gave in the pressure, acted as an informer under the code name Nowak, 
and met her contact officer ten more times to provide information. She maintained 
that her activity as an anticommunist opposition member belied the accusation of 
collaboration, and insisted that political police agents should not be allowed to 
write the history of communism1. Historians believe that archives hold the keys to 
historical puzzles, but the case suggests that archival documents should be com-
plemented by personal interviews and oral histories. 
TRIALS AGAINST COMMUNIST OFFICIALS 
As other Eastern European countries, Poland has struggled to bring charges 
against communist officials and political police agents, and differentiate between 
crimes subject to the Penal Code (torture and killings) and offences legal when 
committed whose prosecution could be construed as politically motivated (spying 
for the SB). Attempts to bring justice by means of criminal law have focused on 
crimes against humanity, although it was recognized that communist-era human 
rights abuses took the form of mass surveillance not mass killings. The number of 
trials has remained low because of flagrant political interference and manipulation, 
the difficulty to build strong cases resulting in convictions, the legal chicanery em-
ployed to prolong or stale the proceedings, intimidation of witnesses, prosecutors 
and judges, and the judges’ unwillingness to take up such cases. Unable to con-
vince judges to support transitional justice, in 1998 Parliament allowed judges who 
had served from 1944 to 1989 to be brought before a disciplinary court and be re-
moved from service if it was proved that they had issued unjust sentences or ob-
structed the defendant’s right to a defense. Afterwards, the Council of Judges can-
celled the retirement pensions of seven Stalinist-era judges, and announced that 
the past activity of 16 other judges was closely scrutinized (Poland has around 
25,000 judges in total). Judges saw these decisions as punishment for their lack of 
                                                    
1 Niezabitowska's undisclosed past came up when another member of Solidarity Weekly, 
Krzysztof Wyszkowski, examined his own file and learned that was spied by a secret 
collaborator code named Nowak. Researchers at the Institute of National Remembrance 
determined that Nowak was Niezabitowska, and Wyszkowski gave that information to the 
press. See The New York Times, 14 January 2005, and Andrew PURVIS, ”The Reckoning. How 
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co-operation with the Lustration Court and unwillingness to hear criminal cases 
related to transitional justice1. 
To date, court proceedings have referred to crimes committed either during 
the Stalinist or the martial law periods, with the cases the courts heard first not 
necessarily referring to higher repression levels. The only case falling outside these 
broad categories investigated the military’s use of force in the suppression of the 
Gdansk strikes in 1970. Opened in 1990 at the request of Minister of Justice Alek-
sander Bentkowski, the case later faced the opposition of those seeing it as a dis-
traction from the more pressing task of judicial reform. The court took four years to 
investigate the case, not because of lack of documents but because of the exces-
sively voluminous documentation (90 volumes of 200 pages each) presented to it. 
The trial, considered the Polish equivalent of the Nuremberg trial, began on 28 
March 1995 in Gdansk. Some 12 defendants – among them then Minister of De-
fense Jaruzelski, Minister of Interior Kazimierz Switala and Deputy Prime Minister 
Stanislaw Kociolek – were accused of ordering the police to shoot at protesting 
workers, killing 44 and wounding about 200. The order to shoot was initially given 
by Gomulka and Politburo members Kociolek and Zenon Kliszko, no longer alive. 
In 1996, the court discontinued proceedings against Jaruzelski, but the Court of 
Appeals overturned that decision, allowing the General to face trial. Court pro-
ceedings against four defendants, including Jaruzelski, were suspended and the 
opening of the trial of the remaining defendants delayed because it proved impos-
sible to gather all of them for a formal reading of the charges. All claimed they 
were unable to appear in court for heath reasons. Jaruzelski denied responsibility, 
and at the trial’s opening session told the families of those killed that he could not 
forget the hundreds of wounded policemen and soldiers2. The protest of the 
Gdansk shipyard workers, resulted from steep price increases two weeks before 
Christmas, took the form of riots, accompanied by violence and efforts to storm the 
party headquarters3. The involvement of agents provocateurs in the damage was 
never ruled out. 
The investigation of these cases depended on whether the statute of limita-
tions applied to communist-era crimes. In 1991, the Constitutional Court dealt a 
serious blow to transitional justice through court proceedings when it rejected the 
law giving the Committee for the Research of Hitler’s Crimes additional responsi-
bilities to investigate communist crimes. The court argued that by defining Stalin-
ist crimes too broadly, the law retroactively lifted the statute of limitations and 
contradicted Article 1 of the Constitution, which recognized Poland as a democ-
ratic state under the rule of law. After the ruling, the courts were confused about 
which communist crimes the statute of limitation applied to, the more so since the 
statute did not apply to crimes perpetrated by Nazis against Poles. Some judges 
argued that the statute had lapsed for most communist-era cases except those in-
volving murder and crimes against humanity, while other judges claimed that the 
                                                    
1 ”Poland”, East European Constitutional Review, vol. 7, no. 4, Fall 1998, pp. 25-26, and vol. 8, 
nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring 1999, pp. 26-27. See also Jonathan LUXMOORE, ”Poland Fears Its Judas 
Files”, cit. 
2 Andrzej WALICKI, ”Transitional Justice…cit.”, p. 223. 
3 Rzeczpospolita, 29-30 September and 9 October 1990; Jan B. DE WEYDENTHAL, ”Inquiry 
into the Murder of Father Popieluszko Reopened”, Report on Eastern Europe, 17 August 1990, 
pp. 12-15; Gerard DeGROOT, ”Accidental Hero of the Revolution”, Scotland on Sunday, 4 July 
2004, and Nigel ASCHERSON, The Polish August, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981, p. 101. 
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statute applied to all cases which could not be fairly tried before the end of the 
communist regime1. 
This later position was reflected in the amendments to Article 108.2 of the Pe-
nal Code the UW proposed in 1991. The changes read that ”the statute of limita-
tions for deliberate crimes against life, health, freedom or the administration of jus-
tice, which are punishable by the deprivation of liberty for a period of more than 
three years and were committed by public officials from 1 January 1944 to 31 De-
cember 1989 during or in connection with that official duties, begins to run as of 1 
January 1990”. The SLD majority rejected the changes, proposing instead that trials 
be carried out under the guidelines of international law, which applied the statute 
to crimes other than murder, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ultimately, 
the Sejm approved the changes on tolling the statute as part of a larger package of 
reforms to the Penal Code. As a result, the statute of limitations was extended for 
some important cases from the martial law era, including the case of the shootings 
at Wujek in 1981. Neither the Ministry of Justice nor the Committee for the Re-
search of Hitler’s Crimes collected data on the number of trials involving commu-
nist state officials, but Calhoun identified at least 30 trials stemming from both the 
Stalinist and martial law eras, and launched before 20012. 
Important moral triumphs for the anticommunist camp occurred in 1998. On 16 
April, the Senate declared the Soviet-occupied Poland a non-democratic, totalitarian 
state, whose political structures violated the 1935 Constitution, and invalidated the 
1952 communist Constitution. Two months later, on 18 June, Parliament con-
demned the ”communist dictatorship imposed in Poland with force and against the 
will of the nation by the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin”, and blamed the PZPR for 
the ”crimes and offences” of a regime which ”protected foreign interests” and was 
maintained ”by force, lies and the threat of Soviet intervention”3. Notwithstanding 
these decisions, hailed as a long overdue moral condemnation of the communist re-
gime, the individual prosecution of communist officials who ordered the atrocities, 
and secret political police agents who executed them, proved to be difficult. Most 
trials were based on circumstantial evidence, as the evidential material was often 
destroyed shortly after the crime was committed. When witnesses were incapable of 
indicating the guilty, the defendants denied the accusations. 
Prosecuting the Abuses of the Stalinist Period 
In 1991, Parliament enabled two different committees to investigate Stalin-
ist-era crimes. While their responsibilities overlapped, the committees comple-
mented rather than competed with each other. In April, the house gave the Com-
mittee for the Research of Hitler’s Crimes the task to investigate communist 
crimes. The law aimed to facilitate criminal trials of individuals responsible for hu-
man rights abuses during the late 1940s and early 1950s by creating an investiga-
tive group responsible for examining the cases and by abolishing the statute of 
limitations for these crimes. The committee made little progress in studying those 
                                                    
1 See Maria LOS, Andrzej ZYBERTOWICZ, Privatizing the Police-State…cit, pp. 190-191. 
2 Noel CALHOUN, Dilemmas of Justice…cit., pp. 179-180. 
3 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 11 June 1998. 
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crimes and preparing cases for prosecution. By August 1992, it investigated 293 
crimes, but investigations led to no arrest. Some of the accused were already dead, 
old or gravely ill and unable to travel, and the evidence linking them to the atroci-
ties was patchy, inconclusive or locked in unavailable archives. Many documents 
had been destroyed, making it difficult for the courts to have a legal basis for act-
ing. Archival documents were difficult to verify against and complement with in-
formation obtained from other sources, and oral testimonies were unreliable, as 
events happened five decades earlier, people had partial recollections, and memo-
ries were subjective1. 
Somewhat more successful was the Coordinating Committee for the Study of 
Crimes against the Polish Nation, which from 1991 to 1995 conducted over 500 in-
quiries and passed 95 cases to the State Attorneys’ Office, which issued 20 indict-
ments. Only the case of former head of the Investigations Department of the Minis-
try of Public Security, Adam Humer, led to a public trial. The hearings, seen as a 
trial of the entire Stalinist system in Poland, lasted five years. On 6 September 1993, 
just two weeks before the general elections, the trial of Humer and 15 of his associ-
ates began, and quickly became a reference point in the electoral campaign. While 
the SLD defended the old regime and claimed that the crimes of the Polish com-
munists represented a far lesser evil than Nazism, their political rivals insisted to 
expose publicly the communist atrocities. Humer was charged with murdering an 
opposition activist, beating and torturing political prisoners (including women) 
from 1946 to 1952 in Soviet-occupied Poland, and ordering the police not to inter-
fere in the Kielce murder of Jews on 4 July 1946. His conduct during the trial was 
ostentatiously unrepentant. On 7 March 1996, the Warsaw Court found Humer 
guilty of nine of the 12 charges of torture, and sentenced him to nine years in 
prison. Ten of his subordinates received sentences of 3 to 8 years. The judge stated 
that ”the case captured a history that was an open wound in the hearts of many 
Polish families. It exposed mechanisms which were unprecedented in acts of terror 
and lawlessness”2. Because of Humer’s health problems, in mid 1998 his sentence 
was reduced to seven years to be spent at home, a decision many Poles contested 
on grounds that the Stalinist regime rested on terror and thus no leniency should 
be shown to its executants. Prosecutor Lucjan Nowakowski and former head of the 
Coordinating Committee Witold Kulesza continued to examine new materials con-
cerning the Kielce pogrom, but no other cases were brought to trial since then3. 
By 1993, former victims of communism became increasingly dissatisfied with 
Poland’s lack of progress in reconsidering its communist past. Gazeta Wyborcza pub-
lished an open letter of Home Army veterans, who had been heavily persecuted im-
mediately after World War II, expressing disappointment that Stalinist criminals re-
sponsible for sending to death Home Army patriots had not been punished. The let-
ter was criticized by intellectuals like Michnik, who stressed that Polish Stalinism 
was milder than elsewhere and communists helped to make the country ”the most 
comfortable barrack in the block”, dismantle Stalinism and pave the way for democ-
racy. Scolding those who assumed that ”People’s Poland should be treated as a 
                                                    
1 Rzeczpospolita, 6 August and 2 October 1992, and Noel CALHOUN, Dilemmas of 
Justice…cit., pp. 106-107. 
2 Rzeczpospolita, 9-10 March 1996. 
3 Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 July 1998. Some Polish historians blame the Soviet KGB for the pogrom. 
A trial of three civilian perpetrators took place in July 1946. Later that year some military and 
police officers were arrested and given light sentences. 
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form of Soviet occupation, and the PZPR as an organization of traitors and collabo-
rators with a foreign power”1, Michnik called for national reconciliation and am-
nesty for former communists. But following the SLD’s electoral victory in 1993, 
Michnik became increasingly isolated as many Poles contended that maintaining 
normal relations with the SLD paved the communists’ return to power by blurring 
the distinction between good and evil. Minister of Justice Wlodzimierz Cimosze-
wicz deplored the lack of political will to prosecute the crimes of the past, and 
spoke of a pseudo-Christian tendency to absolve all sins in a universal forgiveness. 
Supreme Court president Adam Strzembosz suggested that the entire pre-1956 
PZPR leadership should be treated as a criminal organization, but supported a blan-
ket amnesty law, not applicable to murders and crimes against humanity. 
In August 1995, the 80-year-old judge Maria Gurowska stood accused that in 
1952 she sentenced to death General August Emil Fieldorf (alias Nil), the Home 
Army’s chief of diversionary activities, following a show-trial. Gurowska rejected 
the charge, insisting that she had acted in accordance with her conscience. Fieldorf 
was unable to change, and thus had to be ”eliminated from society”. Gurowska 
died before her case come to court, but Fieldorf’s death was not forgotten. In Octo-
ber 1998, Poland summoned Helena Wolinska, a 79-years-old Stalinist-era prosecu-
tor, to answer charges that she fabricated evidence, failed to follow arrest rules, 
and kept Fieldorf in jail without charge for more than 14 days. Fieldorf, arrested in 
1951 and executed on 24 February 1953, was purged by communist authorities at 
Moscow’s urging because the Home Army fostered a spirit of independence 
among Poles resentful of Soviet domination. Recognizing this, in 1989 the Prosecu-
tor General cleared Fieldorf of all charges. Wolinska was accused of fabricating evi-
dence and arresting hundreds of opponents of the Polish Stalinist regime, includ-
ing dissident Wladislaw Bartoszewski, who spent 18 months in prison without 
charge, awaiting trial in 1946-1948. Wolinska took refuge in England after losing 
job in 1956, when a milder leadership denounced the excesses of early commu-
nism. As Wolinska failed to answer the charges, in 1998 the Warsaw District Army 
Court issued a one-month arrest warrant, but she was never extradited to Poland, 
where she claimed her case would not be tried justly2. 
Prosecuting the Authors of the Martial Law 
For Solidarity, the most important issue was to settle accounts with the martial 
law regime, a task made possible only after Jaruzelski renounced the presidency. 
On 1 February 1992, Parliament created a Parliamentary Commission on Constitu-
tional Responsibility to determine whether the State Tribunal should judge Jaruzel-
ski for proclaiming the martial law, Military Council of National Salvation mem-
bers for implementing it, and State Council members for endorsing it. The commis-
sion was interested not to discuss concrete cases of extra-judicial killings, torture or 
disappearances, but to establish if the introduction of the martial law was justified. 
The parliamentary debates preceding the vote revealed two opposing views on 
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Polish late communism. On the one hand, Jaruzelski’s defenders argued that the 
declaration of the martial law spared many Polish lives by preventing a Soviet oc-
cupation. Stefan Niesiolowski distinguished between the dark period of Stalinism, 
when hundreds of victims suffered a cruel fate, and the ”mild” martial law regime, 
when limited numbers of people were imprisoned or lost their lives. On the other 
hand, Jaruzelski’s critics saw the martial law as an unpardonable ”crime against 
the Polish people”1. These arguments spilled over in the work of the committee, 
whose second meeting was preceded by a press conference in which member Jaro-
slaw Kaczynski anticipated the outcome of the inquiry by declaring that ”General 
Jaruzelski and his comrades are guilty of betraying the nation and thus should be 
prosecuted”2. That position was not shared by chairman Edward Rzepka, who ac-
cused defendants of the lesser crime of violating Article 246 of the Penal Code 
which said that public functionaries who used illegal means to promote their mate-
rial and personal interests should receive up to ten-year prison terms. Jaruzelski 
rightly rejected the charge of self-enrichment through martial law. In reply, the 
committee charged the defendants with violating Article 123 of the Penal Code, 
which prescribed the death punishment for treason. 
The treason charge touched on sovereignty, the issue every Pole recognizes as 
central to the country’s history. Was the law proclaimed to protect Poles against a 
Soviet, East German or Czechoslovak invasion or to protect the interests of interna-
tional communism? Did it amount to national defense or national treason? Jaruzel-
ski strongly suggested the first possibility, insisting that at the time he genuinely 
believed that the martial law could forestall the imminent foreign invasion and 
avoid chaos and economic collapse. According to him, the country had plunged 
into anarchy, the economy disintegrated, the delivery of coal and food before the 
winter months was disrupted, thus threatening the people’s survival, and the Soli-
darity’s increased radicalism and mounting aggression against the police and se-
cret police pushed Poland on the edge of civil war. Martial law was the lesser evil, 
and a remarkably mild operation, given its scale. To add insult to injury, Jaruzel-
sky deplored the fact that party reformists like him, committed to Gorbachev’s 
perestroika, were humiliated not thanked. But his position took for granted that an 
invasion was imminent, that, if unavoidable, it would have been a greater disaster, 
that martial law was devoid of repressive intentions, and that he wanted to usher 
in democratization, not effect limited changes to keep the system alive. Mieczyslaw 
Rakowski, Jaruzelski’s friend and the last PZPR general secretary, believed that 
”Jaruzelski would have called martial law, Soviet threat or no”3. The opposing ex-
perts argued that the PCPR leadership explicitly asked the Soviet military and 
party leaders not to send troops to Poland, and thus the latter fully knew that no 
Polish leader endorsed plans for intervention. Brezhnev’s interventionist impulses 
were further tempered by the active Polish resistance to outside intervention, and 
the problems the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan was then facing. Of these two 
opposing views, Jaruzelski’s proved the most popular. Some 71% of Poles believed 
martial law had been justified4. 
                                                    
1 For more details on the parliamentary debates preceding the vote, see Andrzej WALICKI, 
”Transitional Justice…cit.”, pp. 206-207, and Tina ROSENBERG, The Haunted Land…cit., 
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2 Andrzej WALICKI, ”Transitional Justice…cit.”, p. 223. 
3 Tina ROSENBERG, The Haunted Land…cit., p. 217. 
4 Ibidem, p. 242. 
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After the 1993 elections, the SLD parliamentary majority reshuffled the com-
mission, making sure a majority of its members represented that party. In Decem-
ber 1994, the opposition asked the house to condemn the martial law as unconsti-
tutional, even by communist standards, but the leftist majority toned the proposal 
down to a tribute to the victims of the struggle for freedom, a reformulation con-
demned by the opposition as a moral crime against the nation. After four years of 
activity, in 1996, the commission ended its investigation and recommended Parlia-
ment to drop the case against Jaruzelski and his collaborators, without presenting a 
convincing case for either decision. The vote was split, five out of 18 members an-
nouncing their intention to ask Parliament to call for court proceedings be 
launched against the authors of the martial law. Jaruzelski also believed that only a 
court decision could clear his name1. 
Jaruzelski and his supporters claimed that the martial law was mild, and re-
fused to admit that political killings did occur in the 1980s. In August 1989, the Sejm 
set up a commission headed by Jan Rokita to investigate allegations that the SB was 
involved in political murders after the martial law was proclaimed. The so-called 
Rokita commission submitted its final report to Parliament just before the 1991 gen-
eral elections. According to the report, which was never released to the larger public, 
the commission investigated 122 suspicious deaths in the custody of the SB, recom-
mending in 88 cases that prosecutors launch criminal proceedings against Ministry 
of Internal Affairs officials and prosecutors who tried to cover up the cause of death. 
The commission named 100 secret officers and 70 prosecutors unsuitable for further 
employment in the state organs, and concluded that under communism secret agents 
acted with almost total impunity because they enjoyed the protection of the PZPR 
and the judiciary. The ministry often issued express instructions to the prosecutors 
on how to conduct investigations and sometimes carried out investigations itself. 
The judiciary cooperated systematically and extensively with the ministry: prosecu-
tors did not request documents from the SB, and the courts routinely dropped 
charges against SB officers violating the law2. Few of the cases mentioned in the 
Rokita report reached the courts. Characteristic features were the long duration of all 
inquiries and the extraordinary slowness of the court trials. Of those which did reach 
the courts in the early 1990s, some of the most important are mentioned below. 
On 24 July 1990, an inquiry into the death of Father Jerzy Popieluszko began. 
The October 1984 brutal killing of the well known Roman Catholic priest, the Soli-
darity chaplain, was investigated by the courts after his funeral attracted close to one 
million mourners. Such a reaction could not be ignored, as might have happened in 
the earlier days of Solidarity. To maintain order and incur favor with foreign govern-
ments, Jaruzelski allowed for a trial. Four SB agents received prison terms of be-
tween 14 and 25 years, which were later drastically reduced for undisclosed reasons. 
The communist prosecutor asked for the death penalty for the perpetrators, but also 
condemned the priest for defying the communist authorities, and allowed the court 
to become a forum for open attacks on the church. The trial manipulated the public 
into believing that the murder was an isolated case and all those guilty were pun-
ished. In 1990, the Ministry of Justice announced that new evidence confirmed suspi-
cions that two high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had abetted 
the crime and supervised its execution. The two were acquitted in mid 1994, but two 
years later the verdict was quashed by the Court of Appeal. Eventually more charges 
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were added and a new trial was to begin in 1998, but the case was returned for fur-
ther investigation. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
leadership had known about and approved of their subordinates’ criminal actions. 
No one from the then leadership was charged in this case1. 
In 1993, Kiszczak was accused of causing the deaths of nine miners and 
wounding 25 others in a clash with special anti-riot police at Wujek in 1981. The se-
cret forces were authorized to use live ammunition without strict instructions 
about when this would be justified. Evidence was destroyed, witnessed were con-
victed on fabricated evidence or forced into giving false statements. While travel-
ing to the court, Kiszczak had a heart attack and could not cooperate with the in-
vestigating magistrates. The courts also had to reckon with the fact that the legal 
basis of prosecution was the communist law, which condemned the opposition 
and defended the secret police. In May 1996, Michnik spoke at the trial as a witness 
for the defense, testifying that Kiszczak had always maintained that the Wujek kill-
ings disregarded his orders. Three months later, Kiszczak was acquitted of all 
charges, but the case was reopened after this verdict was quashed by the Court of 
Appeals. A protracted trial of 22 other men accused in the killings started in late 
1992 and ended in November 1997 with the acquittal of all defendants. 
The Warsaw Court indicted three militia men for the alleged beating and 
death of Grzegorz Przemyk, the teenaged son of the opposition poet Barbara 
Sadowska, in May 1983. In April 1997, the trial ended as inconclusive. While the 
judge ruled that there was no doubt that Przemyk’s death was caused by the mili-
tiamen, there was insufficient evidence to identify the culprits. An accused was ac-
quitted, another one was sentenced to four years in prison for instigating the beat-
ing, and the director of the Militia Investigation Bureau received a suspended sen-
tence of one and a half years for trying to cover up the murder. Kiszczak and the 
Politburo members who orchestrated the murder and cover-up were not on trial, 
although their involvement was well-documented. In May 1998, the Court of Ap-
peal acquitted the director, quashed the acquittal of a militiaman, and prohibited 
the other from working in the police for five years, in addition to his four-year 
prison sentence. The courts also heard arguments against three commanding mili-
tia officers for shootings that occurred during the suppression of a 31 August 1982 
peaceful demonstration in Lubin, which resulted in killing three people and 
wounding more than a dozen. The trial resulted in the acquittal of all three militia-
men. The Court of Appeal ordered a retrial, but in 1998 the lower court made a 
controversial legal decision to stay the charges based on past amnesties2. 
CONCLUSION 
Poland was often regarded as a country which opted for protracted but exten-
sive lustration, but a closer look reveals that from inception the Polish lustration 
departed significantly from and was more modest overall than the Czech model in 
scope. Of the roughly 23,000 people who submitted lustration statements, only 
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several tens of officials who denied their previous ties to the communist political 
police were found to be lustration liars, and even fewer had to give up their public 
positions as a result. The Lustration Court has been extremely slow to verify the 
accuracy of lustration statements, and the 2001 legislative amendments made it 
more difficult to weed out secret agents from among post-communist politicians. 
Apart from the minimal impact of lustration legislation, I would go as far as saying 
that the Polish lustration was no lustration at all, since it stopped short of remov-
ing the officials and collaborators of the communist regime but rather punished in-
dividuals who chose to give false declarations. The country has scored rather mod-
estly in two other transitional justice areas, file access and court proceedings. Only 
Poles wronged by the communist regime were granted access to their own files, 
and only a fraction of the extant secret archive (which itself is but a fraction of the 
original SB archive) has been made available to the public. As time passes and the 
perpetrators of communist-era crimes die or become ill, it is even more improbable 
that court proceedings will prosecute such crimes. 
There are several possible explanations for this ”forgive and forget” policy. 
First, the Polish communist regime was a relatively liberal, national-accommoda-
tive system, which tolerated dissent and opposition to a certain degree, and never 
actually experienced a period of totalitarian rule, although the first decades of 
communist rule were marked by unspeakable abuse1. The communist party al-
lowed families to privately own a substantial share of agricultural land and small 
parties to participate in politics, a token recognition of pluralism in a region where 
communist parties ruled unchallenged. Fostered by the Catholic Church, the trade 
union movement and intellectual-worker collaboration, the civil society remained 
vigorous in the face of political police intimidation. Although Jaruzelski’s martial 
law entailed widespread surveillance, a ban on public gatherings and travel re-
strictions, the opposition was able to organize a powerful moral crusade against 
the regime, which in turn had to legitimize itself by constantly inviting its detrac-
tors to a ”constructive cooperation”. Arguably, ”for most Poles, martial law was a 
period not of intense repression, but of intense boredom”2. While one might take 
issue with the wording of such phrase, its spirit was reflected by international rat-
ings. Freedom House deemed Poland to be partially free in terms of political and 
civil rights for eight years between 1972 and 1987, when other communist coun-
tries were not free3. In addition, Jaruzelski was more flexible than Husak or 
Honecker, and did not force intellectuals to work at menial jobs. In short, their so-
cial contract with the communist authorities allowed Poles to enjoy limited per-
sonal freedoms to compensate for lower living standards4. 
                                                    
1 Poland and Hungary were seen as ”national-accommodative” communist regimes. See 
Herbert KITSCHELT, Zdenka MANSFELDOVA, Radoslaw MARKOWSKI, Gabor TOKA, 
Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Competition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 40. Linz and Stepan categorized Poland as a milder 
authoritarian, not post-totalitarian, country. See Juan LINZ and Alfred STEPAN, Problems of 
Democratic transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, p. 255. 
2 Tina ROSENBERG, The Haunted Land…cit., p. 227. 
3 Raymond D. GASTIL, Freedom in the World, Freedom House, New York, 1989, pp. 53-54. 
4 See Andrzej PACZKOWSKI, ”Poland, the ’Enemy Nation’ ”, in Stephane COURTOIS et al., The 
Black Book of Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
1999, pp. 363-393, and Joni LOVENDUSKI, Jean WOODALL, Politics and Society in Eastern Europe, 
Macmillan Education, Basingstone, 1987, pp. 68-90, 314-346. I also thank Dr. Stola for his input. 
Transition, Justice and Transitional Justice in Poland 283 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VI • no. 2 • 2006 
Second, the Roundtable talks of February-April 1989 allowed for the peaceful 
transfer of power at the price of concessions for the top communist leaders. Jaru-
zelski and his Minister of Internal Affairs, General Czeslaw Kiszczak, were the 
two key players who forced the hesitating Central Committee to endorse the 
Roundtable Agreements, by threatening to tender their resignation if the PZPR 
maintained its monopoly of power. In turn, the Solidarity parliamentary majority 
respected its part of the bargain by electing Jaruzelski – true, by a majority of only 
one single vote – to the office of president. Quite unexpectedly, the elections of 4 
June 1989 allowed the PZPR to win only one of the freely contested seats in Parlia-
ment (which represented all Senate seats and 35% of the Sejm seats, according to 
the Roundtable Agreements), a deficit of authority the opposition took advantage 
of to nominate the Prime Minister. Solidarity intellectual Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
thus became Poland’s first non-communist premier heading a government in 
which the PZPR was a junior partner. Solidarity honored the Agreements because 
they were the only guidelines for managing an uncertain political transition, and 
because it believed that only gradual political reform could work in the face of 
communist authorities who had used force in the past, and while Soviet troops 
were stationed in Poland. The talks successfully ended in a compromise because 
both negotiating partners – the PZPR officials and Lech Walesa’s Solidarity team – 
set aside a serious discussion of the past. Thanks to the ”forgive and forget” strat-
egy the political transition proceeded smoothly and allowed the country’s new 
leaders to concentrate on economic reforms. 
Third, prominent Solidarity leaders – including Jazek Kuron, Adam Michnik 
and Bronislaw Geremek – were of Marxist origin and had begun their political life 
in the PZPR, where they sought to reconcile socialist realism with personal and 
public freedom. Even premier Mazowiecki had represented a Catholic group in the 
communist Parliament sometimes in the 1960s. Almost a third of PZPR’s three mil-
lion members joined Solidarity, and many Solidarity members entered Parliament 
in the 1980s1. As Osiatynski noted, ”for many members of the first-generation 
power elite after 1989, de-communization would have been a painful and fearsome 
experiment in soul searching”2. Because ”the incumbent political elite and the op-
position were more closely related than allowed for by the ’society against the 
state’ stereotype of 1980s Poland”3, the debates about transitional justice have 
hinged on legal procedure more than justice and historical truth. The focus on pro-
cedure allowed communists to offer good public reasons for their opposition to 
transitional justice and, together with the Solidarity liberals, to block transitional 
justice efforts during the first decade of post-communist rule. The former commu-
nists’ inclusion in a debate reserved to democratic forces elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe was possible by setting aside the question of the citizens’ moral responsi-
bility under repressive communism4. 
                                                    
1 At least one member of the Politburo joined the Solidarity. See Tina ROSENBERG, The 
Haunted Land…cit., p. 161. 
2 Wiktor OSIATYNSKI, ”Decommunization and Recommunization…cit.”, p. 37. 
3 Carmen GONZALEZ-ENRIQUEZ, ”De-communization and Political Justice…cit.”, p. 238. 
4 Noel CALHOUN, Dilemmas of Justice…cit., p. 94 and Maria LOS, ”Lustration and Truth 
Claims…cit.”, p. 157. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary the moderates saw the need to ban former 
communists and secret agents from entering the post-communist Parliament, but in Poland the 
moderates rejected any for of lustration. Aleksander SMOLAR, ”Comment gerer le passé…cit.”, 
pp. 53-64. 
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Last, the post-communist balance of powers also determined the pace of tran-
sitional justice, but the dynamic of its influence departed significantly from the 
theoretical models proposed to date. Calhoun and Walsh have suggested that, once 
controlling the machinery of government, the former communists will resist transi-
tional justice, while their political rivals will support it. Paradoxically, the Polish 
example shows a more nuanced constellation of policy positions and ideological 
options. First, the procrastination of transitional justice came in response to the 
way Minister Macierewicz disclosed the identity of alleged secret informers by 
completely disregarding procedure. As a result, even the Poles committed to learn-
ing the truth about communism, and aware of the difficulties of morally evaluating 
past actions, were put off by the unwise choice of rapidly naming names over 
granting the accused the right to appeal, as though the two were mutually exclu-
sive. While indeed the pro-democratic forces were more inclined to support lustra-
tion, a botched identification of ”torturers”, to use Huntington’s term, quelled the 
appetite for vengeance of former communists and their political rivals alike. Sec-
ond, note that the former communists and President Kwasniewski were the ones 
who pushed lustration and file access forward, and insisted on court hearings. 
Their reasons for supporting transitional justice had to do less with genuine com-
mitment to democratic values or willingness to find out the truth about communist 
abuses and more with the desire to control the damage done by the collapse of the 
Oleksy government. As elsewhere in the region, the camps of supporters and de-
nouncers of transitional justice did not perfectly correspond to the ideological 
camps of pro-democrats and former communists. 
The Polish case is also instructive for Romania, a laggard in all transitional jus-
tice areas. True, calls for lustration were voiced immediately after the collapse of 
the Ceauşescu regime, as part of the famous Article 8 of the Timişoara Declaration, 
but the Romanian post-communist political class has given a cold shoulder to fur-
ther attempts to unmask former communist collaborators from within its ranks 
mainly because the country which experienced the bloodiest exit from communism 
was unable to reshuffle its political elite. Both in 1996 and in 2004 the opposition 
Democratic Convention and the Justice and Truth Alliance, respectively, have won 
the popular vote with promises of moving the transitional justice process forward. 
Both times they were unable to sustain the momentum and push relevant legisla-
tion through a disinterested, if not outright resistant, Parliament in which, para-
doxically, they controlled a majority of the seats. The Polish solution to downgrade 
lustration to a screening process sidelining only politicians who deny their past 
could only remotely address the need to punish the leaders of the ancien regime, but 
represent an acceptable compromise for Romania. Similarly, the Institute for Na-
tional Memory could constitute a worthy model for the much-politicized National 
Council for the Study of Securitate Archive. Romania is also well advised to set up 
special committees tasked with investigating communist crimes other than those 
related to the December 1989 revolution. 
 
 
